This article bridges the gap in studies of the social bases of democratization between qualitative studies focused on social groups and quantitative studies focused on national characteristics. Qualitative historical evidence suggests the importance of classes-in particular, the emerging class of intellectuals-in the wave of democratizations in the decade before World War I. Quantitative cross-national data on a more recent wave of democratizations, from 1989 to 1996, confirm these findings. Models using direct maximum-likelihood estimation find that the ratio of adults with higher education has a significant positive effect on change in democracy levels, as measured by two longitudinal scales (Polity IV and Polyarchy). Proxies for the working class and the middle class-candidates proposed in previous studies as the social basis of democratization-also have significant effects.
focus: the qualitative studies focus largely on the formation and political positions of social groups, while the quantitative studies focus largely on characteristics of countries as a whole. This article attempts to bridge these two gaps through the study of two waves of democratization, one in the early part of the 20th century and one in the latter part.
This article bridges the methodological gap by combining qualitativehistorical and quantitative approaches. For the early 20th century, we rely primarily on the former, as few indicators of interest are available in systematic cross-national format for that period and, further, too few nondemocratic countries were independent at that high-water mark of colonial conquest to run multivariate analyses. For the late 20th century, we rely primarily on quantitative methods, in an attempt to include the entire population of nondemocratic countries. For each period, we introduce the primary analysis with suggestive findings using the opposite method.
The article bridges the substantive gap by combining national and class factors in the quantitative analysis. We collect indicators of the classes identified in the qualitative-historical literature on democratization (bourgeoisie, middle class, and working class) and attempt to adjudicate their influence relative to national-level variables more commonly used in the quantitative literature, such as wealth, religion, and colonial heritage.
In addition, the article proposes a new candidate for the social basis of democratization: the modern "class" of intellectuals. We recognize that many movements, including non-and antidemocratic ones, involve intellectuals. This was one of the founding insights of the sociology of intellectuals, as expressed by Karl Mannheim in the 1920s: "Unattached intellectuals are to be found in the course of history in all camps" (Mannheim [1929 (Mannheim [ ] 1985 ). Yet Mannheim was writing at a distinctive moment in the history of intellectuals (Kurzman and Owens 2002) , a period of "intense spiritual self-criticism" among "demoralized" intellectuals (Michels 1932, pp. 123-24) . Prior to World War I, by contrast, the intellectual identity was a matter of pride and the basis of collective mobilization, as discussed below. This identity was closely associated with a particular form of political activism: democratization movements.
We argue here that intellectuals were important for democratization in two waves of democratic transitions, both sparked by dramatic changes in Russia (Kurzman 1998b) . Ricocheting around the globe for approximately eight years each (1905-12 and 1989-96) , these waves represent bookends of democratization in the 20th century. We find that intellectuals provided hegemonic leadership and organizational infrastructure for the democracy movements of the early 20th century. We find also that the size of a country's intellectual "class" (as measured by the prevalence of higher education among adults in 1988) is significantly correlated with the likelihood of democratization in 1989-96, as are indicators of the size of the working class and the middle class.
Please note that these findings speak to the emergence of democracy, not to its maintenance. We accept the argument of Przeworski and his colleagues (Przeworski et al. , 2000 Przeworski and Limongi 1997) that these are separate processes. In other work, we explore the question of whether intellectual-led democratization is less durable than other routes to democracy. Further, we accept the possibility that there are multiple routes to democracy (Tilly 1997 (Tilly , 2000 . Intellectuals are not the only social basis of democratization. A related caveat: we do not suggest that intellectuals are always vanguards of democracy. Rather, we argue that, in different ways, intellectuals in particular periods may lead democratization movements and that two such periods occurred during the 20th century. Our approach is analogous to those of scholars who have argued that other social classes-the bourgeoisie, the middle class, or the working class-form the social basis of democratization. The argument is that social groups may have an "elective affinity" for a particular form of politics, but that this affinity is expressed only in particular historical conjunctures: according to one influential analysis, the bourgeoisie supports democracy only when it emerges from the shadow of repressive landowning elites (Moore 1966) ; according to another, the middle class constructs liberal democratic regimes only when it feels immune to challenges from the left (Luebbert 1991) ; in yet another, working-class efforts on behalf of democracy vary according to international context and the level of capitalist development (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992 ).
CLASS ACTORS AND DEMOCRATIZATION
The three leading candidates proposed for the social basis of democracy, then, are the bourgeoisie, the working class, and the middle class.
Bourgeoisie.-Modern economic practices, especially long-term investment and the rational calculation of market conditions, are said to require the predictable application of law and limits on the arbitrary application of state power. For such reasons, the bourgeoisie is said to prefer democracy to autocracy. Indeed, the bourgeoisie has long been identified as "the protagonist of democracy," as noted critically by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, p. 46) . In Barrington Moore's famous phrase: "No bourgeois, no democracy" (Moore 1966, p. 418) . Two theoretical traditions have staked out this position: Marxism, emphasizing the role of capitalist self-interest in the making of "bourgeois democracy" ever since the Communist manifesto (Marx and Engels [1848] 1978, p. 475; Lenin [1905 Lenin [ ] 1975b ; and liberal pluralism, emphasizing the congruity of economic and political "freedoms" (Hayek 1944; Goodell 1985) . Recent case studies demonstrating the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization include Cardoso (1986) and Seidman (1994, pp. 91-142) on Brazil and South Africa; Payne (1994) on Brazil; Conaghan and Malloy (1994, pp. 86-97) on Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru; Nam (1995) and Bellin (2000) on South Korea; Parsa (1995) on Iran and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines; and Yılmaz (1999) on Turkey.
Working class.-Critics of the bourgeoisie's role in democratization argue that elites support only limited political openings that they are able to control, and that full democratization is the work of the working class. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) present the most extended case material for this position. They argue that the rise of the bourgeoisie may appear to be associated with the rise of democracy, but that this correlation is spurious and generated only by an underlying cause: the same capitalist development that generates a strong bourgeoisie also generates a strong working class and "it is especially the working class that has often played a decisively pro-democratic role. . . . Capitalist development enlarges the urban working class at the expense of agricultural laborers and small farmers; it thus shifts members of the subordinate classes from an environment extremely unfavorable for collective action to one much more favorable" (pp. 58-59) . Other recent case studies emphasizing the role of the working class in democratization include Adler and Webster (1995) on South Africa; Collier and Mahoney (1997) and Collier (1999) on several countries in southern Europe and South America; Fishman (1990) on Spain; Keck (1992) on Brazil; Osa (1998) on Poland; Seidman (1994) on Brazil and South Africa; Wood (2000) on El Salvador and South Africa; and Yashar (1997) on Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Middle class.-Another contemporary social-class argument focuses on the middle class (Luebbert 1991; Glassman 1995 Glassman , 1997 , following Aristotle's dictum that "democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in government" (Lipset 1981, p. vii) , and similar comments by James Mill (Sundhaussen 1991, p. 100) . Defining this class is difficult. Its boundaries appear to combine economic, educational, cultural, and other characteristics, as in this recent description: "People with more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with more education, and more access to health and other services are more likely to ask for increased political freedom" (Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993, p. 166) . Recent case studies of middle-class support for democratization include Girling (1996) on Thailand; Hsiao and Koo (1997) and Koo (1991) on South Korea and Taiwan; and So and Kwitko (1990) on Hong Kong. To these three candidates we wish to add a fourth:
Intellectuals.-The prominence of students and graduates in democracy movements of the early 20th century, as discussed in this article, leads us to identify the intellectual "class" as the social basis of democratization. Similar theories date back to Edmund Burke's disparaging reference to the prominent role of "men of letters" in the French Revolution (Charle 1996, p. 74) ; the self-proclaimed "aristocracy of intelligence" in the Austrian revolution of 1848 (Namier 1946, p. 22) ; Oxford dons' search for an alliance of "brains and numbers" in 1860s Britain (Kent 1978) ; the Dreyfus Affair intellectuals' evolution into a prodemocracy movement in France in the early 20th century (Blum 1935, p. 103) ; and the global student movements of the 1960s (Brochier 1968; Gouldner 1979) . This theory matches the findings of Benavot (1996, pp. 398, 400) , who finds a positive effect of higher-education enrollment rates in 1980 on democratization during the period 1980-88. Recent case studies of intellectuals' prodemocracy mobilization include Bailly (1995, pp. 109-20) on Cô te d'Ivoire; Calhoun (1994) and Cherrington (1991) on China; Garcelon (1997) and Greenfeld (1996) on the Soviet Union; Puryear (1994) on Chile; Torpey (1995) on East Germany; and Williams (1998) on Nigeria. It may seem anomalous today to speak of intellectuals as a "class," even with the quotation marks, but this was not always so. In the early 20th century, it was not uncommon for intellectuals to refer to themselves as a class (e.g., James 1912, p. 319; Lévy 1931, p. 6, both quoted below) . This definition involved a certain amount of self-congratulation: other classes are beholden to narrow economic interests as a result of their participation in production, in this view, while intellectuals' interests are congruent with those of society as a whole as a result of intellectuals' nonparticipation in production. Hostile observers also used class terminology, while suggesting that intellectuals' interests were just as narrow as those of other classes, if not more so (Berth 1914) . This terminology was reintroduced to the study of intellectuals in the late 20th century by Pierre Bourdieu (1989a Bourdieu ( , 1989b Bourdieu ( , 1990 ). We do not insist on the term "class" but adopt it in this article to be consistent with previous theories on democratization that use the concept. We note that our findings may be interpreted through a nonclass perspective as well, which would emphasize a more diffuse impact of higher education on democratization in the late 20th century.
Quantitative studies of democratization frequently theorize the importance of one or more classes but have not used direct measures to test their theories. Bollen and Jackman (1995, pp. 983-84) criticize Muller (1995) on this very point. Muller argues that "increase in size of [the] urban middle and/or working class" (p. 969) is one of the key factors in democratization, but he takes no direct measure of the size of these classes, using national wealth and income inequality instead. Lipset et al. (1993, p. 166) , too, argue explicitly that democracy is the work of the middle class; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994, p. 903) suggest that "increasing economic benefits for the masses intensify demands for the political benefits of democracy"; Crenshaw (1995, p. 703) wishes to test the "classanalytic approach" focusing alternatively on the role of the bourgeoisie or the working class; and Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 157) seek to test the hypothesis that "various groups, whether the bourgeoisie, workers, or just the amorphous 'civil society,' rise against the dictatorial regime, and it falls." Yet none of these studies measures the size, much less the strength or political attitudes or activism, of the social groups in question. Instead, these studies use national-level variables-primarily national wealth-as proxies for social classes. In the latter part of this article, we try to improve on this record with a first stab at direct measures of the size of these various classes.
How to conceptualize classes? The wide-ranging debates on this subject offer little closure, and there are some who consider the concept of class to be hopelessly flawed (Pakulski and Waters 1996) . We are not going to resolve the controversy over its meaning and value. Indeed, methodological constraints have driven us to adopt quite separate approaches for our two tests of the hypothesis that classes, in particular the intellectuals, matter for democratization. These approaches lie on opposite sides of the great divide in the study of class: a focus on classes-in-themselves and a focus on classes-for-themselves. The latter approach, exemplified by the work of E. P. Thompson (1963) , treats classes as existing when people believe in them and act accordingly. The former approach, which appears to be dominant in contemporary social science (see reviews of the field in Saunders [2001] ; Sørenson [2001] ; Wright [2001] ), treats classes as objective social categories whose existence may or may not be recognized or championed by their members.
2 Our study of the 1905-12 wave of democratizations adopts the class-for-itself approach (with the exception of a preliminary glance at higher-education statistics), focusing on the collective mobilization of people who called themselves intellectuals. Our study of the 1989-96 wave of democratizations adopts the class-in-itself approach (with the exception of the measure of the bourgeoisie), focusing on the size of objective social categories. INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1905-12 The term "intellectuals," as a collective self-identification, gained global popularity through the Dreyfus Affair in France in 1898, in which a movement of French writers and academics contested and eventually overturned the conviction of a Jewish military officer imprisoned for treason (Charle 1990; Gervereau and Prochasson 1994; Ory and Sirinelli 1986) . Intellectuals around the world followed news of the Dreyfus Affair intently, and many intellectuals appear to have drawn inspiration from the mobilization of their French comrades (Leroy 1983; Veillard 1994) . In addition, they drew on the term "intellectuals" itself. In Spain, where virtually "all the literate men" of Barcelona signed a manifesto in support of the Dreyfusards (Jareñ o Ló pez 1981, p. 154), the term intelectuales gained currency almost immediately (Marichal 1990, p. 18) . In Iran, the terms daneshmandan (knowledgable ones) and, later, monavvaran ol-fekr (people of enlightened thought) became popular terms of self-identification among those with modern education, as did the terms mü nevveran (enlightened ones) in Turkey and ziyalilar (enlightened ones) in Central Asia. In Russia, the older term intelligentsia, previously used to refer to alienated, radical youths, changed in meaning to encompass the broader identity of the French term intellectuels (Confino 1972, p. 138; Fischer 1958, pp. 51-52) . In the United States, the term "intellectuals" was adopted by progressive academics and political reformers such as the philosopher William James, who told the Association of American Alumni in 1907:
We alumni and alumnae of the colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries. We have continuous traditions, as they have; our motto, too, is noblesse oblige; and unlike them, we stand for ideal interests solely, for we have no corporate selfishness and wield no power of corruption. We sought to have our own class consciousness. "Les intellectuels!" What prouder clubname could there be than this one. (James 1912, p. 319) Who were the intellectuals? In objective terms, they were the holders of advanced degrees, this being the equivalent of a high school degree in some countries in this period. In subjective terms, intellectuals consisted of people who called themselves intellectuals. In other words, the category was a contested badge of honor or an insult. On one hand, intellectuals were constantly inventing and defending definitions of their group that would include themselves and exclude others (Bauman 1987, p. 8) . On the other hand, anti-intellectuals-including writers and other educated individuals who "objectively" belonged among the intellectuals-derided the group as effete (as opposed to men of action), deracinated (as opposed to good nationalists), and freethinking (as opposed to those who respected authority) (Honoré 1983) . Clearly, not all intellectuals supported democratization, and we have no cross-national estimates of the relative size of these groups: people who claimed intellectual identity versus people who rejected it despite being well-educated. Classes-in-themselves, however defined, almost always include putative members who do not consider themselves to be members of the class.
In the early 20th century, though, people who identified themselves as intellectuals, who sought to build solidarity among intellectuals, and who saw this social group as having an important role to play in social and political life-these intellectuals supported democratization. When the intellectuals' collective identity and organization were on the increase, democratization movements were more likely; when intellectuals were dispirited and disorganized, as in the interwar period described by Michels (1932) , they turned more to antidemocracy movements.
Descriptive Statistics
Six countries underwent prodemocracy revolutions in the years before World War I: Russia in 1905 , Iran in 1906 , the Ottoman Empire in 1908 , Portugal in 1910 , Mexico in 1911 , and China in 1912 (see the schematic chronology in table 1). All of these countries ousted dictators or forced them to accept significant limits on their power. All of them promulgated or reinstituted constitutions. All of them held elections and convened parliaments in an atmosphere of relative freedom. All of them witnessed the almost overnight emergence of a boisterous press. We wish to compare these six with nondemocracies of the period that did not undergo democratization. By late 20th-century standards, almost all independent countries at that time were nondemocracies. Only four countries enfranchised more than half of the adult population (Flora 1983; Boli 1987, p. 139; Mackie and Rose 1991) . Only eight or 13 countries could be called democracies in 1904-the year prior to the wave of democratizations-according to the definitions suggested in two recent longitudinal democracy scales, Polyarchy (Vanhanen 1984; 2000a, p. 257; 2000b) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2003; Jaggers and Gurr 1995, pp. 473-74) . Polity IV is a 21-point integer scale constructed from two subscales: DEMOC and AUTOC. DEMOC is an 11-point scale (0-10) that awards points for various levels of competitiveness of political participation (up to 3 points), competitiveness of executive recruitment (up to 2 points), openness of executive recruitment (up to 1 point), and constraint on chief executive (up to 4 points). AUTOC is an 11-point scale (0-10) that awards points for high levels of regulation of political participation (up to 2 points) and low levels of competitiveness of political participation (up to 2 points), competitiveness of executive recruitment (up to 2 points), openness of executive recruitment (up to 1 point), and constraint on chief executive (up to 3 points). Subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC generates a summary measure, POLITY, with a range from Ϫ10 (most autocratic) to ϩ10 (most democratic). The second scale, the Index of Democracy (ID) in Vanhanen's Polyarchy data set, is constructed from electoral data. It consists of the product of two indicators: the percentage of the popular votes received by political parties other than the leading party, and the percentage of the country's population that votes, converted into a 100-point scale (Vanhanen 1997 (Vanhanen , 2000b . The authors of both scales have proposed cutoffs for minimum levels that can be called democracy: 6 for POLITY (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, p. 474) and 5 for ID (Vanhanen 1990, p. 33; Vanhanen 1997, pp. 63, 80; Vanhanen 2000a, p. 257) .
The democratic standards of the early 20th century, however, were somewhat less restrictive: Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, for example, were considered democracies at the time (Bryce 1922 ), but they fail to meet one or both of the Polyarchy or Polity IV thresholds. To create a time-specific comparison set of nondemocracies, we take the range of democracy scores for 1904 of the six countries that were about to undergo prodemocracy revolutions. These countries occupy Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2003) scores less than or equal to -3, and Polyarchy (Vanhanen 2000b) scores less than or equal to 0.5.
These criteria generate categories of 22 democracies and 31 nondemocracies in 1904. The nondemocracies were considerably lower in socioeconomic development than the democracies of the time, as gauged by Arthur Banks's (1981) composite index (see table 2 ).
3 The nondemocracies were also less literate (Flora 1973) , less highly educated (Banks 1971) , less urbanized (Banks 1971) , and less Protestant (Barrett 1982) . 4 Their states were less democratic historically (Marshall and Jaggers 2003; Vanhanen 2000b ) and raised less revenue per capita (Banks 1971) .
These comparisons confirm one of the most consistent statistical findings in social science: the correlation between economic development and levels of democracy (Diamond 1992; Londregan and Poole 1996) . Economic development also underlies all of the main class-based theories of democratization: it is associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1978; Lenin 1975b; Moore 1966) , the expansion of the working class (Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992) , and the emergence of a middle class (Lipset 1959 .
We therefore expect that the most economically developed of the non- Note.-"Democracies" are defined by either POLITY 1 Ϫ3 or Polyarchy ID 1 0.5 in 1904; "democratizers" are defined by the coming to power of a constitutional revolution in the years 1905-12 (Russia, Iran, Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, China). Independent variables use 1904 values. Significance levels refer to onetailed t-test for comparison of means.
democracies would be most likely to undergo democratization soon thereafter. Only Russia fits these theoretical expectations. Of the nondemocracies in 1904, it was among the most economically developed (Banks 1981) . It had more miles of railroad track than any other country in the world, except for the United States (Banks 1971) . Its exports ranked sixth in the world, and its steel production fourth (Banks 1971) . The Russian revolution of 1905, leading to the proclamation of a sort of constitution late in the year and the election of a parliament the following spring, is consistent with the correlation between economic development and democratization so frequently demonstrated in the second half of the 20th century.
But the expected pattern is broken in some of the democratizations that followed Russia's. These democratizers were not necessarily the most economically developed countries in 1904, according to Arthur Banks's (1981) scale. China and Iran, for example, were among the four leastdeveloped countries in the world, and the Ottoman Empire ranked in the middle of Banks's list. On average, the six democratizers were slightly less developed than the countries that remained nondemocracies during this period, though the difference is not statistically significant (see table  2 ). Similarly, various databases show that democratizers had lower literacy rates than nondemocratizers (Flora 1973) , slightly lower primary school enrollment rates (Banks 1971; Benavot and Riddle 1988, pp. 205-7) , and somewhat less democratic heritage (measured by the country's average Polity IV and Polyarchy ratings prior to 1904 as a percentage of the maximum ratings).
5 Their populations were slightly less Protestant, according to Barrett's (1982) estimates of professed faiths in 1900.
Although per capita terms are the natural lens for late 20th-century development, they may be anachronistic for the early 20th century. In that period, observers more frequently used absolute figures to measure development (Keltie 1904; Great Britain 1914) . It was common at the time to view history as the product of vanguard visionaries, whose importance in shaping a nation's destiny far outstripped their small numbers. The democratizers were considerably more populous than nondemocratizers, on average (from Banks 1971), and when we multiply the Banks's development scale (first adding 2.5 to bring the lowest cases above zero) by population, we find that the democratizers begin to cluster near the top of the list: six of the 10 most developed nondemocratic countries in 1904, in these absolute terms, underwent democratization in the wave of 1905-12. The means of democratizers and nondemocratizers are significantly different. This combination of high absolute levels of development and low per capita levels suggests that democratization was associated with an enclave of modernity surrounded by a sea of premodernity. This enclave image is confirmed by the marginally significant difference in means for urbanization (percentage of population living in cities of 100,000 or more, from Banks 1971) .
Such an enclave is consistent with all of the class-based explanations of democratization: the bourgeoisie, the middle class, the working class, and the intellectuals, all of whom were associated with modern institutions and urban settings. However, we do not have direct measures of any class but the intellectuals, and that one is not ideal (for a discussion of operationalizations of class, see the first part of the analysis of the 1989-96 democratizations). Banks (1971) gives the number and rate of secondary and university students in each country-we sum the absolute number and average the rate for the years 1865-1904, in an attempt to proxy the size of the secondary-and university-educated population in each country. This count does not include people who studied abroad and returned, and it does not indicate how many intellectuals emigrated after studying in their country of origin-both of which groups played significant roles in some of the democratization movements of the period. It does not measure the level of self-organization of the intellectuals. And it does not distinguish between educated people who self-identified as intellectuals and those who did not. Nonetheless, using this best-available data, we find that existing democracies in 1904 had produced far more universityeducated people than had nondemocracies. Among the nondemocracies, there are no significant differences in the per capita figures between countries that democratized in the following decade and those that did not. The absolute numbers of secondary and university students, however, are more than twice as high in the democratizers, with the difference reaching a marginal level of significance for secondary students.
The implication is that democratization is associated with the building of a cadre of university students and graduates. For example, Afghanistan had only perhaps 100 high school students and a handful of graduates in 1904, most of them associated with the newly founded Habibiyya School, the first modern-style high school in the country (Gregorian 1969, p. 184) . Like their colleagues in neighboring Iran, whose multiplying modern-style schools were a model for the Habibiyya School, intellectuals in Kabul organized themselves into a prodemocracy movement, the National Secret Party, and began in 1906 to publish a newspaper, Lamp of the News of Afghanistan (Ahang 1970, p. 31; Nawid 1997, p. 598) . A poem in the first issue linked intellectuals and the demand for liberty, suggesting that education "wiped oppression off the mirror of time" (Habibi 1993, p. 42) . But unlike the prodemocracy movement in Iran, the movement in Afghanistan was too small to effect serious change, failed to garner the support of other social groups, and could not protect itself when royalists denounced the party to King Habibullah. The monarch, a self-described "advocate of Western learning"-he had founded the Habibiyya School and named it after himself-considered democratic demands to be a threat to his prerogatives and, in any case, premature, as Afghans "needed thirty years of education to be fitted for the post" of democratic citizenship (Gregorian 1969, pp. 187, 212) . In 1909, many of the prodemocracy intellectuals were arrested, including officials of the Habibiyya School, and some were executed (Ghani [1921 (Ghani [ ] 1980 Ghobar 1983, pp. 716-20; Nawid 1997, p. 598) . Thereafter, Afghan intellectuals downplayed democracy and addressed reform projects to royal patronage (Gregorian 1969, p. 213; Tarzi 1912) .
Institutional Linkages of Intellectuals and Democratization Movements
Turning from quantitative to qualitative analysis, we find that the infrastructure of the democracy movements is closely linked with the selfconscious collective organization of intellectuals in all six countries that underwent prodemocracy revolutions. In Russia, the central prodemocracy organization, the Union of Liberation, emerged in 1901-3 from student groups, professional associations, and gentry-intellectuals. All of its members had secondary degrees (in a country more than half illiterate); 82% had a higher education; 21% worked in journalism, 20% in science and academia, and 16% in law (Galai 1973, pp. 113-19; Frö hlich 1981, pp. 238-39) . The prodemocracy movement's "banquet campaign" in 1904 brought together educated people from various professions in an attempt to unite "the bulk of the country's intelligentsia around the constitutional banner," in the words of one of the organizers (Ascher 1988, p. 66) . The Union of Unions, which organized the strikes in 1905 that forced the tsar to grant democratic rights (the October Manifesto), also viewed itself as the representative of the intellectuals: "Under the present conditions we members of the intelligentsia have for too long protested merely by word" (Sanders 1985, p. 845) .
Similarly, other prodemocracy movements of the era also involved selfconscious collective action on the part of intellectuals. In Iran, the first explicitly prodemocracy organization, the Revolutionary Committee, was founded in May 1904 by 57 men, almost all of whom had a modern education in one form or another, either at European-style schools in Iran or through informal study of European languages or ideas (Abrahamian 1982, pp. 78-79; Malekzadeh 1950, vol. 2, pp. 9-10) . A leader of the organization announced the social basis of the movement at the first meeting: "However benevolent a force of intellect and faith intellectual [the anachronistic term rowshanfekr is used in this report] men may mo-bilize, they will not succeed in anything without gaining power and strength" (Malekzadeh 1950, vol. 2, p. 13) . A second prodemocracy organization, the Secret Society, was founded in early 1905 with a similar self-understanding. One of the founders opened the first meeting with these words: "Oh gentlemen, oh intellectuals [daneshmandan], oh patriots, oh supporters and reformers of Islam" (Nazem al-Eslam Kermani 1968, p. 6). The triumph of the prodemocracy movement in the summer of 1906, during a monthlong sit-in held on the British legation grounds in Tehran, acquired its prodemocracy character only when a delegation of teachers, graduates, and students from modern schools joined the sit-in and commandeered it. Setting up their own tent alongside those of the various guilds of the city (Tafreshi-Hosseini 1973, p. 41), these modern intellectuals lectured on democracy, teaching that "when the nation no longer wants a shah [king] he is not recognized" (Martin 1989, p. 93) and turning the sit-in into "one vast open-air school of political science" (Abrahamian 1982, p. 84) . "Since those who took refuge in the Embassy had absolutely no concept as to what a constitution was or what it required, a special group kept them informed and instilled in them its own ideas," according to a socialist prodemocracy activist (Sheikholeslami and Wilson 1973, p. 37) . Intellectuals dominated the sit-in's negotiating committee and inserted a constitution and a parliament among the protest's demands; they kept various groups from leaving the sit-in as negotiations continued over these demands (Abrahamian 1969, p. 134; 1982, p. 85; Bayat 1991, p. 135; Browne (1910 Browne ( ) 1995 Hakim (1911 Hakim ( ) 1999 Martin 1989, pp. 94-96; Nazem al-Eslam Kermani 1968, pp. 118-19, 272-74; TafreshiHosseini 1973, pp. 41-42) .
In Mexico, the leader of the prodemocracy movement, Francisco Madero, identified as the leading supporters of democratization "the poor intellectuals who have not suffered the corrupting influence of wealth. Among those one finds the thinkers, the philosophers, the writers, the lovers of the Fatherland and of Freedom" (Madero [1908 (Madero [ ] 1990 . In China, "It is estimated that at least ninety-five percent of those who received part of their education in other lands became, on their return, leaders of revolutionary thought" (Brown 1912, p. 81); modern intellectuals were so closely identified with the democracy movement that in late 1911, when the prodemocracy revolution had broken out, antidemocratic imperial forces executed young men in at least one city for wearing modern school uniforms (Liew 1971, p. 123) . In Portugal, intellectuals saw themselves as the "vanguard" of society (Ramos 1992) , endowed with "the sacred mission" of transforming the nation (Valente 1976, p. 145) , and the democracy movement's self-conception appears to have centered on the "enlightened" elements that compose "the great base of the Republican Party" (Vilela 1977, p. 112) . The Ottoman prodemocracy activists "re-cruit[ed] their ranks, for the most part, among the intellectual youth," according to a participant (Keramett Bey 1924, p. 477; also Hanioǧlu 1995, p. 207) , and an opponent derided prodemocracy leaders as "Turkish Dreyfuses" (Kara 1994, p. 75) . The leading prodemocracy Ottoman newspaper, published in Paris, editorialized:
Thus whether the people get upset about something-for example, whether or not they will oppose despotism-depends on the intellectuals of the nation. . . . In sum, it may be said that if a small rudder can by itself steer a ship ten or twenty thousand times its size, the intellectual notables can similarly manage the ordinary masses, steering them forward or backward. (Ş û ra-yı Ü mmet, May 20, 1905, p. 1) 6 This correspondence of democracy movements with intellectual selforganization is worth exploring through a "deviant" case. Colombia had as many intellectuals in 1905 as Portugal, which experienced democratization soon thereafter. If intellectuals mattered for democratization, why didn't Colombia undergo democratization? One answer involves the problematic self-organization of the Colombian intellectuals. Although Colombia had quite a few intellectuals, they were deeply divided amongst themselves and had in fact fought a civil war several years earlier (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) . The liberals were led by Rafael Uribe Uribe, who championed the "intellectual proletariat" (Santa 1980, p. 56) and argued that "dictatorship is a vulgarity; to disdain it, one need only be somewhat learned, somewhat intelligent, and have a somewhat good education" (Uribe Uribe 1979, p. 247). Opposed to these self-identifying intellectuals were conservatives who criticized higher education in Colombia, emphasized Catholic faith rather than rational free-thinking, and pressured liberal intellectuals to sign oaths written by Catholic bishops (Farrell 1974, pp. 307-9) . Civil war erupted between these two strands of intellectuals and damaged the prospects for collective democratic action (Bergquist 1978; Delpar 1981) . The Colombian case underscores the importance of intellectual organization, and not merely numbers, in fostering democratization during this period.
Hegemony of Intellectuals in the Democratization Movements
A further confirmation of the role of intellectuals in democratization before World War I is the leadership accorded to them by other social groups participating in prodemocracy movements. The intellectuals were hegemonic, in that their interests and goals were equated with the interests and goals of society as a whole. The classes commonly identified in the social scientific literature as the protagonists of democratization viewed themselves not as leaders but as followers of the intellectuals. This is not to say that the bourgeoisie, the workers, and the middle class were wholeheartedly in favor of democratization. Rather, we argue that the portions of these classes that favored democratization did so under the banner of the intellectuals' movement. We present as evidence the political activities of the organizations claiming to represent these classes; for this reason, we omit discussion of the middle class, which was not represented in its own name in the early 20th century in these countries.
The emerging bourgeoisie.-Lenin called the pre-World War I wave of democratizations "a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national movements" (Lenin [1914] 1975a, p. 162), but, even if we accept this characterization, it is striking that the bourgeoisie was a latecomer to these movements. Most capitalists in these countries were closely linked to the autocratic state and were unwilling to risk their economic position by associating with political reformers.
When capitalists became partially involved in the prodemocracy movement, they did so with deference to the hegemony of the intellectuals. In Russia, industrialists who supported democratization even adopted the identity of "intellectual." V. Belov, for example, wrote that "all of us intelligentsia, industrialists and non-industrialists, feel every minute that we are under surveillance" (McDaniel 1988, pp. 128-29) . In early 1905, business associations in Russia began to adopt a prodemocracy line in response to workers' strikes. The government proposed to end the strikes by forcing business owners to make economic concessions; the business owners balked and proposed instead that the government end the strikes by making political concessions. This conflict drove a wedge between the autocracy and its erstwhile supporters in the bourgeoisie (Menashe 1968, p. 355; Owen 1981, pp. 175-78; Rieber 1982, p. 345; Roosa 1975, pp. 130-31; Ruckman 1984, pp. 195-201) . The capitalists trying to forge a nationwide bourgeois organization sought to gain admission to the intellectuals' prodemocracy organization in mid-1905. The intellectualsapparently unwilling to risk sacrificing workers' support-turned the capitalists' delegation away at the door. The capitalists, furious and embarrassed, asked the intellectuals to consider that "this visit had not taken place" (Owen 1981, pp. 186-87; Rieber 1982, p. 312) .
The intellectuals' democracy movements were more open to bourgeois support in the other cases under study. In Portugal, for example, an intellectual worried in the months after democratization that "we are turning against us the same bourgeoisie that allowed us to make the republic. . . . Do you not recall that the ox that feeds can change into the ox that gores" (Brandã o 1933, pp. 35-36) . In China, portions of the bourgeoisie in Tientsin (Sheridan 1975, p. 45) , Guangdong (Friedman 1968, p. 32) , Shanghai (Bergère 1989, p. 198) , and the southeast Asian diaspora (Yen 1976, pp. 264-77) helped to fund the intellectuals' prodemocracy movement. In Mexico, several important prodemocracy figures were themselves capitalists, including the movement's leader, Francisco I. Maderothough Madero preferred to identify himself as a representative of the "intellectual element" in Mexican society (Madero 1990, p. 210 ). Yet bourgeois organizations in Mexico failed almost entirely to support Madero and his prodemocracy movement, which they attributed to "laggards" who have made a "deep and disagreeable impression . . . among the sensible part of society" (El Economista Mexicano, November 26, 1910, p. 177) . In the Ottoman Empire, chambers of commerce and industry appear to have played no role in the prodemocracy movement, though several individual businessmen were active (Kansu 1997, chap. 2) and business associations expressed satisfaction upon its coming to power (Toprak 1995, pp. 84-87) .
Oddly, the emerging bourgeoisie played its greatest role in this wave of democratizations in the country where it was least well developed. In Iran, there were few industrial enterprises, and chambers of commerce had been banned two decades earlier (Afary 1996, pp. 30-31; Bayat 1991, pp. 47-49 ). Yet leading merchants, organized in traditional guild associations, catapulted the democracy movement into power by engaging in sit-ins against the state's arbitrary economic policies (Gilbar 1977) . The merchants' goals were limited, but they called in students and faculty from Tehran's new modern schools, who lectured them on the need for democracy and inserted the call for a constitution and a parliament into the strikers' list of demands (see previous subsection). In Iran, as elsewhere, the emerging bourgeoisie took a back seat to the intellectuals in the democracy movement.
The working class.-The emerging working class, too, where it existed, identified the democracy movement with the intellectuals. In Russia, Father Georgii A. Gapon, the leader of the largest union in St. Petersburg, established contacts with "several intellectual Liberals" and "invited students and other educated people to deliver lectures at all our branches on political questions." Gapon then endorsed the intellectuals' prodemocracy platform and had its demands read at union meetings, where workers indicated enthusiastic, almost millenarian, approval (Gapon 1905, pp. 133-40; Surh 1989, pp. 140-67) . The reading of the demands for democracy "brought the listeners to a frenzy" at one meeting, according to one eyewitness (McDaniel 1988, p. 268) . On January 9, 1905, Gapon and thousands of his followers carried these demands to the tsar's palace in a massive demonstration that the military fired upon, killing hundreds. This event, known as Bloody Sunday, ignited the democracy movement.
Even Lenin dropped his hostility toward "bourgeois democracy" for a moment and urged "the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution," but rather "to take a most energetic part in it" (Lenin 1975b, p. 126) .
In Mexico and Portugal, workers agitated for intellectual prodemocracy leaders, even intellectuals who disparaged workers' material demands. "Surge et ambula," one prodemocracy intellectual told workers in Portugal-a Latin phrase that might be translated uncharitably as "get up and walk" (Valente 1976, p. 173 ). Yet workers participated actively in the Portuguese democracy movement, suffered the bulk of casualties during the prodemocracy revolution (Valente 1976, pp. 88-89, 138-39) , and even stood guard during the brief interregnum "defending the banks and the money of the rich, with the police and the Guard completely disarmed," as a prodemocracy intellectual recalled in amazement (Brandã o 1919, p. 87) . Similarly in Mexico, workers supported the democracy movement despite its ambiguous stance toward working-class economic demands (Anderson 1976, pp. 254-97) .
In China, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, democracy movements came to power in spite of the almost complete lack of modern working classes. The first industrial union in the Ottoman Empire contacted the exiled prodemocracy movement in the 1890s, but this union was soon suppressed (Dumont 1977, pp. 244-45) . Various popular associations signed on to the intellectuals' prodemocracy programs in Iran (Foran 1991, p. 805) , certain regions of China (Chesneaux 1971, pp. 135-59; Esherick 1976; Shimizu 1984) , and the westernmost parts of the Ottoman Empire (Hanioǧ lu 2001, pp. 242-61), but these were traditional or neotraditional groups, not proletarians. A modern working class-like a developed bourgeoisie-did not appear to have been necessary for democratization; and where this class existed, it supported the intellectuals' prodemocracy platform.
Intellectuals' Role in the Newly Democratized State
After democratization, when elections were permitted and parliaments met, intellectuals were the prime beneficiaries of the transition, and they acted in their own self-interest. In theory, one group might undermine the old regime and another might construct the new regime that follows. That the same group did both in the cases under study is our final set of evidence for the crucial role of intellectuals in the democratizations of 1905-12.
In Russia, the leading party elected to parliament was the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party. This was a "professors' party," according to its leader, Pavel N. Miliukov; another party activist called it a "faculty of politicians" (McClelland 1979, p. 67) ; professionals comprised 60% of the party's candidates for office in early 1906, and another 25% were educated salaried employees (Emmons 1983, pp. 160-79) . Parliament, dominated by the Kadet plurality, was "the dregs of the Russian 'intelligentsia,'" a hostile observer commented (Ascher 1992, p. 178) .
The Kadet Party's platform placed great emphasis on the interests of the intellectuals. These interests aspired to be hegemonic-that is, intellectuals wanted other groups to believe that what was good for the intellectuals was good for society as a whole. Freedom of expression, for example-listed third in the Kadet program-may be good for society as a whole, but it is particularly beneficial for writers. Judicial autonomy (listed fourth) serves the interests of legal experts. Education (listed eighth) is a priority for teachers, for whom the Kadets envisioned a massive jobs program that would allow the intellectuals to reproduce themselves at a greater rate than previously possible: "complete autonomy and freedom of instruction in universities and other higher schools. Increase in their number. Decrease in tuition. Organization, by the higher schools, of educational work for the entire populace. Freedom of student organization. . . . Establishment of universal, free, and compulsory primary education." These expressions of intellectuals' self-interest did not prevent the Kadets from espousing the interests of other classes as well: appealing to peasants and workers, the party included sections on land reform (sixth) and labor legislation (seventh) (Harcave 1964, pp. 292-300) . This sensitivity to popular, nonintellectual issues set the Russian prodemocracy party apart from the other cases in this study, though it was not enough to maintain popular support for democracy.
The Kadets were able to accomplish little of this agenda during their brief period in parliament. Similarly in the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals were ousted from power within a year, too soon to have generated much of a track record, despite their intentions. During the months before the military stepped in, intellectuals proposed educational reform, labor arbitration, tax reform, and agrarian modernization (Kansu 1997, pp. 149-50, 162-63) .
In other new democracies, however, intellectuals had a longer run in power and were able to control parts of the executive branch, not just the legislative. In these countries, the intellectuals left a greater record of accomplishments as evidence of their rule.
In Portugal, the new constituent assembly included 52 physicians among its 229 members, plus 41 lawyers, 9 journalists, and 8 high school teachers (Valente 1976, p. 223) . The editors of the prodemocracy newspaper the World urged "the heroes of the field of battle"-those who had participated in the prodemocracy revolt-to give way to "the heroes of thought," who would rule the new democracy (Valente 1976, p. 191 ). This self-image was matched by outsiders' testimony as well. Old-style intellectuals complained, "The diploma in this country is everything-wisdom, nothing" (D'Almeida 1920, p. 126). Less educated republicans complained that all the best government jobs were going to youths whose sole qualification was "having spent years of their youth eating liver-steaks and strumming guitars alongside the learned teat of the University" (Valente 1976, p. 198) .
Among the first acts of the provisional cabinet in Portugal, after the replacement of monarchist governing bodies, were decrees dear to the interests of the intellectuals: the expulsion of the Jesuits-paragons of premodern intellectuals-and the replacement of the agency heads for primary, secondary, and higher education. Then in the second week, primary school inspectors were replaced; new guidelines for high school teachers were promulgated, emphasizing modern degrees; and high school rectors were fired, their administrative tasks to be assumed by councils of modern-educated scholars. In the third week, Christian teaching in primary schools was replaced with civic education; tuition was made free at the University of Coimbra and the Polytechnical School of Lisbon; the Academy of Sciences was reorganized; and the cabinet took to micromanagement of the University of Coimbra, abolishing caps and gowns, oaths, and the first-year theology requirement (Morgado 1910, pp. 12-76) . "Of all the works that the Republic has to undertake, national education is the one to which it must dedicate its greatest forces," the minister of the interior announced in the fourth week of the new regime (Morgado 1910, p. 134) . Enrollment in universities and high schools rose 50% and 300%, respectively, during the democratic era; hundreds of new teachers were hired, and teachers' salaries were improved. Government education budgets rose dramatically, tilted toward secondary and higher education rather than to primary education (Oliveira 1980, p. 133; 1991, pp. 531-61) .
In Mexico, young intellectuals "picked up the plums of office, while the real captains of the revolution"-the nonintellectuals who had actually fought against the dictator's army-"were fobbed off with, at best, lowly commissions in the rurales [gendarmes]" (Knight 1986, pp. 166-67) . A disappointed prodemocracy activist recalled that Madero, the new, university-educated president, "democratic as far as possible for a man of his class, preferred a priori the lawyer to the carpenter" (Gavira 1933, p. 57) . One of the first policies of the new era was educational reform (Pani 1918, pp. 11-12) . Federal spending on secondary and higher education increased by more than 40% between 1910 and 1912, while total government spending rose 7%; spending on primary education increased only 3% (Ley de ingresos 1910, pp. 171, 329; 1912, pp. 189, 353) .
In China, one of the ruling intellectuals' first acts was to discount telegraph rates for news reports as a boon to journalists (Link 1981, pp. 110-11) . Other measures increased enrollment in the federal education system by 85% over prerevolutionary levels (Huang 1915, vol. 1, pp. 157-58) . 7 Guangdong Province, where the democracy movement was most entrenched and foreign-educated men occupied "practically all the important government posts for the province," moved toward universal, compulsory primary education (Friedman 1968, pp. 162-64, 175, 178, 179) . Similarly, in Iran, more than half the members of the first two parliaments had a modern education (Shaji'i 1965, p. 225) , in a country with only a few dozen modern schools (Menashri 1992, p. 60) . Parliament granted modern-educated lawyers a dominant position in the legal system, displacing seminary-trained scholars as judges (Floor 1983) . Moderneducated physicians were protected from traditionally trained competition (Menashri 1992, pp. 83-85) and granted new powers in the field of public health, with specific tax revenues dedicated to their efforts (Elgood 1951, pp. 531-32) . Systems of censorship were dismantled and intellectuals dove into the profession of journalism: 190 newspapers were founded in the two and a half years after the constitution was announced, according to a recent count (Sa'idi Sirjani 1993, pp. 208-12) . And, as elsewhere, the ruling intellectuals voiced a commitment to universal education, hoping to build a public-school system from scratch (Arasteh 1969, pp. 223-30 ). An Iranian poet suggested that the twin ideals of democracy and science seemed somewhat loftier in principle than the reproduction of intellectuals seemed in practice:
Constitution's star shone to no avail; The sun of science rose, but what did we gain? In cities and towns you now want to base Training centers, there teachers to raise. (Soroudi 1979, p. 34) In sum, intellectuals were the prime beneficiaries of successful democracy movements in the decade before World War I. They took whatever state offices they were able to wrest from the old regime and acted swiftly to pursue their hegemonic interests, a package that included educational expansion, freedom of the press, public health reform, legal reform, and other measures that benefited intellectuals directly (and the rest of society indirectly).
This evidence dovetails with the previous sections to form a consistent picture of an emerging class pursuing and attaining a collective goal. The collective organization that intellectuals forged in the early 20th century was entwined with prodemocracy movements. Other classes identified by theorists as the social basis of democratization were latecomers to these prodemocracy movements, if they played a role at all, and subordinated themselves to the intellectuals' lead. These movements succeeded in countries where the intellectuals were most numerous. The intellectuals then dominated the democratized portions of the state and pursued their hegemonic class interests. This varied evidence supports the contention that intellectuals were central to democratization in the decade before World War I. INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1989-96 If the Russian revolution of 1905 sparked a wave of democratizations at the beginning of the 20th century, the Soviet reforms of the late 1980s sparked another wave of democratizations at the end of the century (Kurzman 1998b) . From 1989 through 1996, several dozen countries underwent democratization of varying degrees (Diamond 1999, pp. 24-25, 60) . In the second part of our analysis, we examine which nondemocracies in 1988 underwent democratization in the following eight years and explore class and national factors associated with democratization in this period. 8 Several case studies suggest that intellectuals played a significant role in this wave of democratization. University groups formed the organizational basis for the democracy movement in China (Cherrington 1991) , Cô te d'Ivoire (Bailly 1995, pp. 109-20) , and Nigeria (Williams 1998) . Educated professionals organized the Democratic Russia movement (Garcelon 1997), the New Forum and other prodemocracy groups in East Germany (Torpey 1995, pp. 139ff.) , and the antidictatorial referendum in Chile (Puryear 1994) . But it is not feasible to conduct comparable case studies for all the countries in this wave of democratizations, so we turn to quantitative analyses of the universe of nondemocracies in 1988.
Case Selection and Measures
Why only nondemocracies? Because we are interested in democratization, the relevant cases are countries that are "at risk" of undergoing democratization. Most of the existing democracies have no room to move upward on the democracy scales and, as a result, would receive democratization ratings of zero-the same rating as nondemocracies that failed to democratize. This combination of high-democracy zeros and low-democracy zeros would confound our findings. By contrast, limiting the sample to nondemocracies in 1988 allows us to focus on democratization after 1988.
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It may well be the case that countries with large working classes, for example, had already become democracies by 1988 and therefore are excluded from our analysis. This finding would be fully consistent with our approach, since we argue that different waves of democratization may have different social bases. Yet we must leave the study of other waves to future research and claim only that these data speak to the class basis of democratization in 1989-96. A final note on sample selection: determining the universe of nondemocracies has the unfortunate side effect of relying on a dichotomous conceptualization of democracy, which, following Cutright (1963) and Bollen and Jackman (1989) , we consider to be a continuous variable. However, this disadvantage is mitigated by the bimodal distribution of democracy in 1988: there were relatively few semidemocracies at that time, according to both of our democracy scales, to complicate the dichotomization.
As in our quantitative analysis of the 1904-12 period, we measure democracy by deferring to the judgment of two prominent democracy scales, Polity IV and Polyarchy (for the construction of these scales, see "Descriptive Statistics" above).
10 Our sample of nondemocracies is as inclusive as possible, comprising countries identified by either scale as a nondemocracy in 1988. These criteria generate a population of 94 nondemocratic independent countries. 11 We also use the Polity IV and Polyarchy scales to construct our dependent variable. For each scale, we calculate a change score (Allison 1990 ): the maximum shift in each country from 1988 to 1996. 12 This shift represents the high-water mark of de-9 This approach might be considered a pseudolongitudinal design, as contrasted with typical cross-sectional analyses that take contemporaneous observations for the independent and dependent variables. A truly longitudinal approach, however, would require multiple observations for each country, which we lack for many of our variables. 10 We opted not to use the Freedom House (1989-97) rating of political rights and civil liberties, because it changed rating personnel in 1989, so that 1988 data cannot be considered comparable to the data for later years (Gastil 1991, p. 45) . Other time-series measures of democracy developed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Bollen (1998 Bollen ( ) end at 1990 Bollen ( and 1988 We removed one country (East Germany) from the data set because it had merged with a preexisting democracy by 1996. We omitted Lebanon because of its missing values on both democracy scales throughout the period 1988-96. However, we kept both North and South Yemen in the data set, despite their merger between 1988 and 1996, because both constituent countries were in the 1988 data set. We used the unified Yemen score to construct the dependent variable for both countries. 12 For Czechoslovakia, which had split by 1996, we averaged the scores of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to construct the dependent variable. For the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, we took the democracy scores of their primary successor (Russia, the rump Yugoslavia). Other components of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are not included in the sample for lack of comparable 1988 data.
mocratization in each country during this period. As described in the methods section below, our models use a latent dependent variable based on these shifts.
Class Indicators
Our key explanatory variables represent four distinct social classes, which we measure directly, unlike previous quantitative studies of the social bases of democracy. We use indicators from 1988 or the latest previous year for which data are available. The qualitative section of this article, on the early 20th century, identified class consciousness and collective mobilization as crucial factors in understanding the social basis of democratization. However, these factors are not readily captured in quantitative measures. The sole measure of collective mobilization that we have been able to discover is a crude indicator of bourgeois self-organization. For the other classes in question, we focus on the social material from which identity might emerge. This first foray into the subject therefore uses the best available data, namely indicators of classes "in themselves," not classes "for themselves." That is, with the exception of the bourgeoisie, we estimate each class as a category, not as a cohesive or self-conscious social group. This approach is commonplace in the crossnational study of class, though this literature has not broached the relationship between class and democratization. The various schemas of the Comparative Class Analysis Project (Wright 1997) , the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification Scale (Prandy 2000) , and other projects (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995) privilege objective definitions of class position over subjective definitions of class affiliation. Our approach is the same, though our measures are considerably less sophisticated, sacrificing rigor and nuance in exchange for a large sample size. The studies just mentioned examine only 35 countries or fewer, with only a handful of cases outside of the wealthy industrialized democracies. We trust that future work will develop improved measures along the paths that we are only beginning to explore.
Bourgeoisie.-As a measure of the size and organization of the bourgeoisie-the only one of our class indicators that takes organization into account-we count the number of chambers of commerce listed for each country in the World Directory of Chambers of Commerce (International Chamber of Commerce 1985) . Bourgeoisies may exist without founding a chamber of commerce or registering it with the global association of chambers of commerce, but we argue that such bourgeoisies are either less developed, less organized, or nonisomorphic to international standards and are therefore less likely, according to the theories developed in the qualitative literature, to mobilize on behalf of democracy. Countries with two or more chambers listed are top-coded at "2" to correct for the far greater detail of reporting in a handful of countries.
Middle class.-We adopt an economic definition of the middle class in order to distinguish it from the intellectual class, which we consider separately. To measure the size of the middle class, we add the second and third highest quintiles of income distribution: the higher the income share of these quintiles, the more wealth is distributed to groups just outside of the elite (proxied here by the top quintile). Our primary source for this variable is the World Development Report (World Bank 1990 and various other years), with additional information from Hoover (1989) , Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio (1992, pp. 402-3) , and World Bank (1998). Despite the multiple sources, we are unable to find income distribution data for 44 countries in our sample.
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Working class.-To measure the size of the working class, we use the percentage of the workforce in industry (United Nations 1991, pp. 150-51). This measure fits well with Rueschemeyer et al.'s (1992) emphasis on industrialization as the underlying process generating working-class activism, referred to above and summarized by Tilly (1997, p. 210) : "Not capitalism itself, but proletarianization constitutes the crucial conditions for democratization." We also tested an indicator of working-class organization constructed by Abootalebi (1995) that is available for 62 countries in our sample, though organization may reflect variation in legal and political environments rather than characteristics of the working class itself.
Intellectuals.-As in our consideration of the early 20th century, we test two operationalizations of the size of the intellectual class, one an absolute number and one a ratio of the adult population. The ratio is drawn directly from Barro and Lee (1994) : the percentage of the population age 15 and above that has attained some higher education. The absolute number of people who have attained some higher education, expressed in millions, is calculated from Barro and Lee's (1994) ratio measure using population distribution data from the United Nations (1989, pp. 274-578) . We also test two alternative measures related to the concentration of intellectuals in academic settings: a partial indicator of collective organization, the number of scientific associations and learned societies in each country (World Guide 1990) ; and the number of highereducation students in 1988 (UNESCO 1995).
14 There is certain to be overlap among these four classes, since capitalists can be educated, educated people may belong to the second or third quintiles in income, and people in these quintiles may work in industry (say, as managers). In theoretical terms, this poses no problem for our analysis, since individuals may hold multiple identities and be counted as a member of more than one group. And in practice, the overlap does not appear to be so extensive as to confound the various measures. The only significant bivariate correlation among these measures is between two groups that seem unlikely to share members: intellectuals and working class.
National-Level Characteristics
In addition to these class variables, which form the primary focus of our study, we control for various national-level characteristics that have been identified as important in the literature on democratization. We group these independent variables into three categories: economic (variables 1-2), social (variables 3-6), and political (variables 7-9) characteristics of countries.
Economic Indicators 1. National wealth.-Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured in U.S. dollars, is the single most commonly used predictor of democracy in the quantitative literature. However, this variable is not available for a dozen socialist countries in 1988 (Clements 1988; World Bank 1990; Penn World Tables 1994) . To maximize sample size and avoid sampleselection bias, we use gross national product (GNP) per capita instead, expressed here in thousands of U.S. dollars (World Bank 1990, supplemented by Jazairy et al. 1992, pp. 386-87) . In any case, the reducedsample GDP figures are highly correlated with GNP (.90) and generate results that are consistent with the GNP results reported here.
2. Economic performance.-To indicate whether the nondemocratic regime in place in 1988 had "delivered" long-term economic growth, we use 14 Future research on this subject may wish to consider the possibility that some fields of higher education are more associated with prodemocracy activism than others. We have not been able to locate data that break down the prevalence of higher education among adults by field of study. In addition, we recognize that intellectuals living abroad may influence democratization in their countries of origin, but we are unable to estimate the size or organization of this population.
average annual growth in real per capita GNP, 1965-88. The sources for this variable are the same as for national wealth.
Social Indicators 3. Population.-Several quantitative studies of democracy control for national population size (here expressed in millions), since small countries may have an advantage over large countries in generating and maintaining democracy (Dahl and Tufte 1973) . This variable is drawn from the Penn World Tables (1994) , supplemented by various sources.
4. Literacy.-Literacy rates (measured as a percentage of the population aged 15 and over [UNESCO 2002 , supplemented by various sources]) are a crude but commonly used measure of social development (Deutsch 1961) . We find the same results when literacy rates are replaced with the percentage of population age 15 and up in 1986-90 that has attained some primary schooling (Barro and Lee 1994) .
5. Life expectancy.-As a proxy for public health and a manifestation of human development (UNDP 1990), we use Barro and Lee's (1994) measure of life expectancy for newborns in 1985. We also test an alternative measure, the mortality rate for newborns in 1985 (Barro and Lee 1994) .
6. Protestantism.-Democracy in its contemporary form first emerged within Christian contexts (De Gruchy 1995; Maddox 1996) . More specifically, several quantitative studies have found that Protestant countries are more likely to be democratic than countries with other religious heritages (Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Iyall 1999; . We use the percentage of population that was Protestant (including Anglican) in 1980, from Barrett (1982) . Bollen and Jackman (1985) , Crenshaw (1995) , and other scholars who report a significant positive relationship between British colonial control and postcolonial democracy, we include a variable indicating how many years, if any, a country had been a British colony or protectorate (Truhart 1984-88) .
Political Indicators 7. British heritage.-Following
8. Militarization.-Since we expect highly militarized states to be less likely to democratize, we include a control variable measuring defense spending as a proportion of a country's gross national product (World Bank 1998, supplemented by US ACDA 1989).
9. Democratic heritage.-On the premise that countries with a democratic background are more likely to be democratic, we include a control variable measuring democratic heritage. We estimate this heritage by summing each country's democracy score since independence (or the beginning of the time series in 1800 and 1810, respectively), then dividing this by the maximum possible democracy score in each scale. We calculate this value separately for the Polity IV and Polyarchy data, 15 and we construct a latent variable combining both values.
Methods
There are two parts to our analysis. First, we analyze the data descriptively. We divide the 94 nondemocracies into two groups: those that reached the Polity IV and Polyarchy thresholds of democracy between 1989 and 1996, and those that did not. We use t-tests to examine the differences between "democratizers" and "nondemocratizers" in terms of class and national-level characteristics.
Second, we move to a multivariate framework to test whether the differences between the democratizers and nondemocratizers hold when the dichotomous distinction is abandoned in favor of a continuous democratization scale, and when we control statistically for national-level characteristics. We employ structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques using the AMOS statistical package. This approach has several advantages over typical regression techniques. First, structural equation modeling accords with our view that democracy is a latent variable that is difficult to observe and most likely measured with error (Bollen 1993) . Indeed, our two indicators of democracy, POLITY and ID, though significantly correlated-among nondemocracies, the bivariate correlations are .51 for 1988, .77 for democratic heritage, .61 for the maximum shift between 1988 and 1996-rely on two entirely different approaches to measurement. We have no theoretical reason to discard either indicator, and structural equation modeling allows us to include both measures in the model rather than choose between them.
16 Second, because of missing values on several variables, we decided to use a direct, full-information, maximum-likelihood method of estimation (Anderson 1957) that is available only in the AMOS software package. Thus, instead of imputing values or deleting cases with incomplete information, we retain all cases in the analysis, which is important given our small sample size. Third, structural equation modeling allows us to estimate correlations among the independent variables, thereby relaxing regression assumptions about noncollinearity. For a graphical representation of our model, see figure 1. 15 As indicated in note 5: to calculate democratic heritage, we added 10 to all Polity ratings, bringing negative values to 0 or above. 16 Both indicators are reliable: with the coefficient for POLITY constrained to 1, the R 2 for ID is 0.89.
Descriptive Results
As in 1904, nondemocracies in 1988 were substantially less developed than democracies. GNP per capita was more than six times higher in the democracies, and almost all of the variables reported in table 3 show significant differences in the expected directions. These findings confirm the correlation between economic development and levels of democracy noted above (Diamond 1992; Londregan and Poole 1996) . To reiterate, economic development also underlies all of the main classbased theories of democratization and is associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1978; Lenin 1975b; Moore 1966) ; the expansion of the working class (Therborn 1977; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992) ; and the emergence of a middle class (Lipset 1959 . We therefore expect that the most economically developed of the nondemocracies would be most likely to undergo democratization soon thereafter. But when we move from a cross-section in 1988 to an examination of democratization in 1989-96, the picture is not nearly so clear. Contrary to expectations, there is no statistically significant difference in GNP per capita between democratizers and nondemocratizers. The growth rate is significantly lower, suggesting that economic stagnation or decline, not economic gain, may be spurring the fall of autocracies. Contrary to expectations, democratizers have no greater British heritage-when this variable is dichotomized, as is sometimes done in the democratization literature, democratizers are significantly less likely to have been British colonies or protectorates. Other national-level variables differ in the predicted directions, but the difference is only statistically significant for three of them: literacy, Protestantism, and democratic heritage (Polity IV scale only), all of which are positively correlated with democratization.
Two social classes appear to be related to democratization in this period: the working class and intellectuals. All of the class variables differ in the predicted, positive, direction, but the difference is statistically significant only for the working class variable and the ratio of intellectuals to the adult population. In the comparison of means for 1904-12, the absolute number of intellectuals was significant and the ratio was not; for 1988-96, the pattern is the reverse. While the nondemocracies with the largest absolute number of higher-educated persons in 1904 participated unanimously in the ensuing wave of democratizations, only half of the top 10 in 1988 democratized by 1996. Of the two nondemocratic countries with by far the most higher-educated persons in 1988-Russia and China, with more than six and three times the number of the third-ranking country, respectively-only one democratized in this wave. The cadre effect implied by the significance of absolute numbers of intellectuals in the early 20th century was not evident in the late 20th century. Instead, the effect Note.-The term "democracies" is defined by both Polity IV (POLITY ≥ 6) and Polyarchy (ID ≥ 5) in 1988; the term "democratizers" is defined by both scales above these thresholds simultaneously in at least one year, 1989-96. Independent variables use 1988 values. Significance tests refer to onetailed t-tests for comparison of means.
ϩ P ! .10. * P ! .05.
of intellectuals seems to lie in their relative, not absolute, numbers; for this reason, the rest of the analysis will focus primarily on the ratio of intellectuals.
Multivariate Analysis
We estimate a series of structural equation models that test the effects of class variables and national-level characteristics on democratization (see table 4 ). Model 1 represents a traditionally specified model of democratization with national-level characteristics-grouped into economic, political, and social indicators-as the only explanatory variables. These results confirm certain findings in the literature on national-level predictors of democratization: Protestantism appears to be associated with a greater likelihood of democratization, and militarization appears to be associated with a lesser likelihood. However, some of our results are not consistent with previous studies. National wealth, the widely confirmed correlate of democracy, is not significantly correlated with democratization, either as GNP or GDP (substituted in models not reported here).
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Economic growth, population, literacy, life expectancy, British heritage, and democratic heritage seem to be uncorrelated with democratization.
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Next, model 2 of table 4 adds all of the class variables except the variable of key interest to us, intellectuals. We find that the coefficients for two of three social classes-the middle class and the working classare statistically significant. 20 The importance of including class indicators is confirmed by the goodness of fit of models 1 and 2. The difference in x 2 values and degrees of freedom for the two models indicate that the three social classes significantly improve the fit of model 1. In other words, the model without the three class variables does not fit the empirical data as well as the model that includes them.
Last, we add the variable representing the social class of key interest to us: the ratio of intellectuals in the adult population (see model 3). This variable has a statistically significant and positive effect on democratization. Moreover, it alters the traditionally specified relationship between When we substitute alternative measures of intellectuals for the ratio in the adult population, the effect is weaker. The absolute number of intellectuals in 1988 is not significantly correlated with democratization in 1989-96. Neither is the number of higher-education students in each country in 1988, suggesting that educated young people are no more important for democratization than older educated people. 22 The only alternative measure that is correlated with democratization is the number of scientific associations in each country in 1988-a crude measure of the collective organization of certain intellectuals, though scientists are a small subset of the category. The higher-education ratio is the only measure of intellectuals that generates a statistically significant improvement in fit over model 2.
DISCUSSION
Intellectuals mattered for democratization in two 20th-century waves of democratization. We present several forms of evidence for an early 20th-century wave, 1905-12: nondemocratic countries with more intellectuals were more likely to undergo democratization than those with fewer intellectuals; the intellectuals' collective organizations provided the backbone for the prodemocracy movements; other classes, such as the bour-21 These findings are partially replicated in ordinary least squares models. The intellectuals ratio is significantly associated with democratization-using either the Polity IV or Polyarchy indicators as the dependent variable-even when controlling for the other variables listed in table 4. The middle class is significantly associated with democratization as measured by the Polyarchy scale but not the Polity IV scale. However, missing data reduced the sample size to fewer than half of the 94 nondemocracies in the SEM models, so we do not report these findings. 22 As confirmation of this finding, we also found that educational expansion had no effect on democratization. To proxy educational expansion in each country, we plotted a line for the number of higher-education students in various years between 1960 and 1988 (from various issues of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook), then included the slope of this line in model 3 along with the current number of higher-education students. The slope had a negative coefficient but was not significant. The same noneffect emerged for the slope of the higher-education ratio.
geoisie and working class, either failed to support democratization or accepted the intellectuals' leadership; and the intellectuals benefited disproportionately from democratization. All of these forms of evidence combine to suggest that intellectuals constituted the class basis of democratization during this period.
Skipping ahead to the end of the 20th century, we present quantitative evidence for 94 countries that were nondemocratic in 1988. Structural equation models combining national-level and class-level variables find that countries with a greater ratio of intellectuals in the population were more likely to democratize in the ensuing eight years than countries with lower ratios. Whether or not intellectuals existed as a cohesive social group at this time, higher education appears to be associated with democratization.
In addition, these models find that the size of the working class and the middle class are correlated with democratization, confirming the value of including class indicators in cross-national quantitative research on this subject. The bourgeoisie appears to have no significant effect, but this may be due to the insensitivity of the measure, the number of chambers of commerce in each country, which is limited to values of 0, 1, or 2. In standardized terms, intellectuals have a larger coefficient than the other classes, suggesting that democratization may be more sensitive to changes in higher education than to changes in other classes.
Despite having found significant class effects on democratization, we do not wish to espouse some sort of lockstep threshold theory of prerequisites for democracy. Such theories fell out of favor in the last generation as they came to be perceived as "too deterministic for our taste" (Przeworski 1997, p. 6), and a large portion of the literature on democratization has shifted away from prerequisites and toward process (Rustow 1970; Di Palma 1990, pp. 4-7; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Pagnucco 1995) , with case studies on countries such as Paraguay (Arditi 1995) and Mongolia (Fish 1998 ) that have undergone democratization in the absence of the usual set of expected prerequisites (Kurzman 1998a) . While leaving room for contingency, we find patterns of significant correlation that suggest an elective affinity between the size of the intellectual class and the likelihood of democratization.
This elective affinity may be time-specific. The early 20th-century link was based primarily on the organizational mobilization of self-identified intellectuals; for the late 20th century, we note the importance of the presence (rather than mobilization) of other-identified (rather than selfidentified) intellectuals. In other words, the ratio of highly educated people (whether or not they self-identify as intellectuals, which we cannot measure) comes to matter more than the mobilization of self-identified intellectuals (whether or not they are highly educated). Our only indicator of intellectual organization in the late 20th century-the number of scientific associations, which captures only one portion of the educated population-has no significant effect on democratization. For the later period, then, democratization is associated with intellectuals as a sort of class-initself; for the earlier period, it is associated with intellectuals both as classin-itself (the bivariate data on absolute number of secondary education students) and as class-for-itself. This discrepancy may be an artifact of our methodology, since we have no measure of intellectual self-identification to test the class-for-itself argument in the late 20th century, and too few cases for multivariate analysis to test the class-in-itself argument in the early 20th century. The discrepancy may also be due, we propose, to changes in the intellectual class. At different periods, it may conceive of itself in different terms or refuse to conceive of itself as a collective entity at all.
Data limitations prevent us from testing our full quantitative model for intervening periods. However, we are able to offer preliminary evidence that the relationship between intellectuals and democratization holds for other years in the post-World War II period. As shown in table 5, intellectuals are significantly more prevalent in democracies than in nondemocracies for each year covered in the Barro and Lee education data set, beginning in 1960. In addition, they were significantly more prevalent in nondemocracies that democratized over the ensuing eight years than in nondemocracies that did not (using an eight-year window in order to be consistent with tables 2 and 3).
By way of illustration, we conclude with suggestive evidence from the years after the early 20th-century wave of democratizations, when intellectuals underwent a dramatic demobilization and disaffiliation with their intellectual group identity. By this time, the emerging democratic institutions discussed in the first half of this paper had been undermined by monarchs or generals. The failure of these new democracies harmed the intellectuals. Their newspapers were closed, their parties were driven from parliament, their state sinecures were purged, and many were driven into exile. The new authoritarians adopted parts of the intellectuals' hegemonic ideology-mass education and public health reform, for example-but without the former hegemons, who were incorporated selectively and only in subordinate roles (Kurzman 2003) .
The intellectuals plunged into despair, and themes of hopeless bleakness emerged in the literatures of all of these countries in the wake of failed democracy. A prodemocracy poet in Iran lamented, "This ruined graveyard is not Iran. This desolate place is not Iran; where is Iran?" (Soroudi 1979, p. 258 ). An Ottoman author opined: "My friend, sometimes the environment is like a bad omen, like a graveyard. What intelligence, what wisdom, what talent can survive there?" (Tunaya 1959, p. 64) . A well- Note.-The term "democracies" is defined by both Polity IV (POLITY ≥ 6) and Polarchy (ID ≥ 5); the term "democratizers" is defined by both scales above these thresholds simultaneously in at least one of the ensuing eight years. Significance levels refer to one-tailed t-test for comparison of means.
* P ! .05.
known Mexican novelist came to the "basic conviction that the fight is a hopeless one and a thorough waste" (Rutherford 1971, p. 89) . In Portugal, the journal School Federation warned, "Black days await us. Days of hunger threaten us. Days of slavery await us" (Mó nica 1978, p. 179) . In Russia, a leading poet worried: "Already, as in a nightmare or a frightening dream, we can imagine that the darkness overhanging us is the shaggy chest of the shaft-horse, and that in another moment the heavy hoofs will descend" (Blok [1908 (Blok [ ] 1966 . A Chinese writer offered this extreme metaphor:
Imagine an iron house having not a single window, and virtually indestructible, with all its inmates sound asleep and about to die of suffocation. Dying in their sleep, they won't feel the pain of death. Now if you raise a shout to awake a few of the light sleepers, making these unfortunate few suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do you really think you are doing them a good turn? (quoted in Schwarcz 1986, p. 13) With their class mobilization in ruins, intellectuals began to criticize the collective identity of "intellectual." In Russia, a widely noted book of essays berated the intellectuals' class mobilization (Read 1979; Shatz and Zimmerman 1994) . In the Ottoman Empire, a popular pamphlet denounced the prodemocracy intellectuals for aping the West (Atis 1995, pp. 250-52) . In Iran, prodemocracy intellectuals were mocked as "national goody-goodies" (Katouzian 1979, p. 544) . In China, leftist intellectuals adopted the slogan "Down with the intellectual class" (Schwarcz 1986, p. 186) . Ironically, it was at this time that a handful of activists, recognizing that "the class of intellectuals" had become "disinherited," tried to establish an international organization to promote their identity and represent their interests (Lévy 1931, p. 6) .
The decline of the intellectuals' collective identity during this period corresponded with their reluctance to pursue prodemocracy movements. In place of collective mobilization for democracy, intellectuals scattered, "looking for new gods" (Shanin 1986, p. 208) . If some intellectuals served in interwar governments, they no longer ruled in their own name but rather in the name of the socialist working class, the nationalist bourgeoisie, or the fascist fatherland-the diversity of camps that Mannheim observed. Democracy during this period, then, was the result of other forces than the collective action of intellectuals.
This shift implies that the social basis of democratization may change over time. If the intellectuals were central in the early 20th century but not in subsequent decades, then democratizations of this period must have had other champions. This suggests that causal explanations of democratization may need to be cautious about generalizing across time: rather than search for a generalized association between certain social classes and certain political configurations, the analysis of democratization may be forced to limit itself to time-specific contexts. But that is the maximal implication of this study. The minimal implication is that intellectuals sometimes matter for democratization, as for instance in the beginning and end of the 20th century. How they matter may have changed over the course of the century, but they-and other classes-deserve systematic attention in the literature on democratization.
